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EFORE A general criminal law can be established, there must
first exist a community whose values are to be protected. There
must be a certain concordia-the prevalence of funda-
mental principles to which all are loyal. Such a consensus, often
difficult to obtain within a national community, has never been at-
tained at the level of international society. Corbett, in summariz-
ing his study Law in Diplomacy, gave the opinion that "What is
principally missing is the measure of agreement on supreme values,
the sense of community, loyalty, and mutual toleration which within
the State make compulsory institutions bearable."'
The absence of an authentic community on the plane of interna-
tional relations is a failure due, in large measure, to the competitive
antagonisms of sovereign states. As each is anxious to attain or
enhance a position of power, potentials of universal accord become
subordinated to the exigencies of power politics. But state sover-
eignty is not, of itself, a complete explanation of disunity. The
failure to agree upon basic norms of behavior also reflects ideo-
logical differences among the peoples of the world.
Governments are bearers of philosophic conceptions of human
destiny which are often irreconcilable. Professor Hans Morganthau,
an expert on power politics, has acknowledged the reality of ideolog-
ical influence upon state practice. In spite of the polycentric tend-
encies of the Communist world, he believes that the continuing
presence of ideology is unmistakable:
[T]he Communist world appears to have reverted to the traditional pluralistic pat-
tern in which individual nations cooperate or compete with each other for the protec-
* MR. MURPHY is a Projessor of Law at the Duquesne University School of
Law; J.D. Boston College; LLM. University of Virginia.
1. CORBETT, LAW IN DIPLOMACY 273 (1959).
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tion and promotion of their respective interests. This is the accepted meaning of
polycentrism. The observation is correct as far as it goes. But it does not go far
enough; for it does not take into account the fact that this polycentric world is com-
posed of nations whose Communist character qualifies the polycentric orientation
of their foreign policies. Because this polycentric world is also a Communist
world, the foreign policies of its members cannot be explained by exclusive reference
to their traditional national interests .... 2
Comparable observations could be made of nations within the orbit
of Western democracy. And in confrontations between the two blocs,
the ideological differences will also have an operative influence.
A nation's conviction that it possesses a true vision of human na-
ture may not determine its foreign policy, but it will be a real in-
fluence upon the conduct of its international affairs. The effects
are substantial enough to warrant an intellectual inquiry into the rea-
sons for ideological conflict, as well as the possibilities of recon-
ciliation. From such an effort we may hopefully move closer to that
universe of shared values which is a precondition to the creation of
an effective international criminal law.
THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGY
The existence of ideologies arises from the necessity of man to
gain a coherent understanding of the world and of his actions. This
urge towards understanding is built upon a number of pre-eminent
ideas and value judgments which are used to interpret events consis-
tently. Ideologies are possessive; those who adhere to basic con-
victions are expected to transform their lives in accordance with
the doctrinal principles. This, in turn, leads to a certain dogma-
tism. The proponents of a particular ideology are hostile to revi-
sion because change challenges that aspiration to completeness which
is the psychological condition for ideological thought.'
In international history, the prevalence of ideologies is a twen-
tieth century phenomenon. Earlier, the influence of ideology upon
foreign policy was more fragmentary; moral and intellectual in-
sights also influenced international activity. In the contemporary
world, ideologies, to the degree that they are influential, are projected
as virtually complete views about man, society and universal destiny.
Wherever a nation, or group of nations, professes an ideology, they
2. MORGANTHAU, A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 56 (1969).
3. See the discussion in Vol. 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES.
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purport to be carriers of truths about every phase of human life,
whether it be economic, political or even spiritual.
In the present world, it is difficult to discuss ideologies with any
amount of consistency. Any effort at general statement demands a
variety of qualifications. Socialism has a wide range of meanings,
depending upon its Marxist or non-Marxist character; even within
orthodox circles there are important divergencies, as evidenced by the
Sino-Soviet split. Within the range of democracy there is a be-
wildering array of differences. Nevertheless, ideological pluralism
can be reduced to intellectually manageable proportions. Let us first
consider socialism. In this essay, we shall use the term as embodied
in Marxist-Leninist philosophy rather than in the less militant philoso-
phies which exist in parts of Western Europe and Africa. The ortho-
dox view is selected for present purposes because it constitutes a
comprehensive intellectual and moral system which is charged
with universal ambitions.' Its embodiment in the political theories
of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China makes it a
major theoretical force at the present stage of history. Within the
Marxist camp there are, of course, differences as well as signifi-
cant defections. Moreover, the exact form of emerging socialist
states such as Algeria and Cuba is a matter of speculation. Yet,
with these qualifications, it is possible to identify Marxist-Leninist
thought as one force involved in the major ideological confrontation
of our time.
The other principal force is Western democracy. This is the
predominant ideological disposition discoverable within the foreign
policies of the countries of Western Europe and North America. It
is also the prevailing philosophy of much of the Hispanic world as well
as parts of Asia and Africa. Again, there are significant variations
which are assumed; nevertheless, there is a specific cognitive and
moral viewpoint which the ideology encompasses, especially as it
has developed under the leadership of the United States. In speak-
4. For Twentieth Century expressions of the ideology, see LENIN, THE THREE
SOURCES AND COMPONENTS OF MARXISM; STALIN, DIALETIC AND HISTORICAL MA-
TERIALISM, and SELECTED READINGS FROM THE WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG (Foreign
Languages Press, Peking, 1967). There is a good critical study of Marxist thought
in MARITAIN, MORAL PHILOSOPHY 220 et. seq. (1962). For a study of the new
forms of African socialism see ONOHA, THE ELEMENTS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM
(1965). The ideas of Julius Nyere are examined in An Ideology for Africa, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1969.
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ing of Western democracy we mean to include economic, as well as
political values within the description. Certain fundamental
principles of property and human initiative are, as we shall see, an
integral part of this point of view.
The ideological framework being developed can be illustrated by
some comparisons. At the economic level, the Marxist sees private
property as an alienating element to be overcome by the community
of workers who, by destroying their exploiters, shall become the re-
surgent force of a true humanism. In the Western democracies,
the accumulation of private wealth is still generally viewed as a
social good, and individual business activity as a desirable mode of
conduct. At the political level, democracy insists that sovereignty
rests with the whole populace (the generic "people"), and also
postulates specific individual rights which can be pleaded against the
state. In Marxist theory, the Messianic role of the working classes
means the gradual transfer to them of political, as well as economic
power. Moreover, the state is the source of rights because it re-
flects the outcome of the inevitable struggle for power. 5
We have suggested that ideological differences prevent that agree-
ment on values which is essential to the development of an interna-
tional criminal law. Whenever ideological motives seriously influ-
ence the foreign policies of different states, antagonism is inevitable.
Ideologies tend to be impervious to objective truth because
those who adhere are committed to the view that their ideas have
universal validity. The resulting inflexibility is sustained by fear,
cultural conditioning, or selfish interests which lie behind a theo-
retical veneer. In any event, the process is not conducive to con-
cord. Ideologies lead to power struggles rather than to the value
sharing which is indispensible to law.
BRIDGING THE IDEOLOGICAL GAP: THE IDEAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
One way of narrowing differences arising from ideological conflict
is to make humanistic aspirations the measure of criminal responsi-
bility. At Nuremberg, the categorization of offenses within the
phrase "crimes against humanity" made it possible for the victor-
5. See Szabo, The Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nobel Foundation, Oslo, 1968).
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ious powers to apply mutually acceptable standards to the delicts of
Nazi criminals. Since the Second World War, there has been an in-
creasing awareness that a concern for the human person is the
only satisfactory basis upon which to build an enduring world order.
If we wish
[t]o break through the massive prejudices and irreconcilable interests that block the
road to a lasting peace and just world order, we must look to a scheme of international
relations which would operate outside the web of national histories, traditions and
interests. The first step in that direction is the emancipation of the human individual
from the shackles of nationality. Without international recognition of man's distinctly
personal character, it is impossible to alter the pattern of the nation-state, which for
so long has remained a fixed and static feature in international life. Second, . . .
the fate of the human person, whoever and wherever he may be, must become
the direct concern of the international community and its immediate responsibility.
Nothing short of the internationalization of man can bring about the great com-
promise between the prerogatives of national sovereignty and the requirements of in-
ternational solidarity, and the reconciliation between the nationalist creed and
the idea of the community of man. 6
Continuing this line of thought, it is arguable that within the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights there exists that concern
for man which is indispensable to world order. For the Declaration
can be viewed as the expression of a common secular faith in the
worth of the human person.
As operative precepts, the contents of the Declaration seem to pro-
vide an adequate practical accord upon which we can build a
universal code of conduct. The eminent philosopher, Jacques Mari-
tain, probably had such possibility in mind when he distinguished
the practical points of convergence expressed in a humanistic state-
ment of principles from the theoretical perspectives by which the
participants ultimately justify the expressed values:
The secular faith . . . deals with practical tenets which the human mind can try to
justify-more or less successfully, that's another affair-from quite different philoso-
phical outlooks, probably because they depend basically on simple, "natural" ap-
perceptions, of which the human heart becomes capable with the progress of moral
conscience. . . . Thus it is that men possessing quite different, even opposite meta-
physical or religious outlooks, can converge, not by virtue of any identity of doctrine,
but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, toward the same prac-
tical conclusions, and can share in the same practical secular faith, provided that
they similarly revere, perhaps for quite diverse reasons, truth and intelligence,
human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good. 7
6. MOSKowITz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 71-72 (1968).
7. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 111 (1951).
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The distinction is intellectually persuasive, but the real difficulty
lies with concrete implementation. The ideals of the Declaration
may reflect the practical convergence of which Maritain speaks (dis-
counting the abstentions' and the elements of political compro-
mise); yet efforts at more specific statements are obstructed by the
very theoretical considerations which are supposed to be irrelevant.
As statesmen have tried to transform the Declaration into concrete
rules, ideological interpretations of human rights have often im-
peded specific agreement. Preferences survive as we move deeper
into the practical realm, thus making it difficult to develop specific
codes of behavior which can be used to protect human rights and
to punish those who would deny them.
These differences have been especially acute in the field of econom-
ics. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized
the right of private property, it has been impossible to translate the ab-
stract acknowledgment into the web of positive international law.
While the Commission on Human Rights was developing the
Draft Covenants on Human Rights, the United States delegate sub-
mitted a draft proposal designed to protect the right of private prop-
erty. It was impossible to obtain agreement upon either the proposal
or alternative formulations and the divergences clearly had ideological
overtones. The approach of the United States (which was never
put to a vote) reflected a conviction that private ownership
is a paramount value which can rarely be subject to jural limitations.
This individualistic emphasis contrasted sharply with the viewpoint
of other delegates who insisted that private property should be lim-
ited by laws enacted for reasons of social progress including ex-
propriation when required by the public interest.
While the ideology of Western capitalism accentuates private prop-
erty, Marxist theory is alert to its harmful consequences. These
differences of approach are particularly evident in efforts to define
8. The U.S.S.R., The Ukraine, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Ara-
bia, South Africa and Yugoslavia abstained. The socialist bloc's major reason was
the expressed conviction that civil and political rights must be limited to prohibit a
resurgence of facism. GANJI, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
149 (1962); THE UNrrED NATIONS AND THE PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE
672 (Asher ed. 1957).
9. Commission on Human Rights, Report, 18 U.N. E.C.O.S.O.C., Supp. 7, at
40-70, U.N. Doc. E/2573, E/CN4/705 (1954).
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the nature of "aggression." At a 1954 meeting of a United Nations
Committee established for that purpose, the Soviet delegate argued
that the concept should include unlawful applications of economic
force which were injurious to human values:
[There would be] an act of economic agression wherever a State taking the initia-
tive, adopted measures of economic pressure infringing the sovereignty of another
State and its economic independence and threatening the foundations of the economic
life of that State; adopted measures in regard to another State impeding the exploi-
tation by that State of its own natural resources or the nationalization of those
resources; imposed on another State an economic blockade. 10
Ideological differences have also been barriers to accord on non-
economic aspects of human freedom. Freedom of speech is instruc-
tive. Agreement has never been attained on the content of free
speech. The Marxist bloc has generally demanded that it be re-
stricted when used to promote "facist" ideas, the West tending to
permit unlimited expression." The liberal position has, on some oc-
casions, been a source of difficulty. For example, Article 4(A) of
the Convention On Outlawing Racial Discrimination obliges the sig-
natories to make the dissemination of ideas based on racial hatred or
racial superiority a punishable offense under their national criminal
laws. Ambassador Goldberg felt obliged to state that the position
of free speech in America required a restricted interpretation of the
Article:
• . . We believe that a government should only act where speech is associated with, or
threatens imminently to lead to, action against which the public has a right to be
protected. Our Supreme Court, in Yates v. United States, emphasizes "the distinction
between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful
action." In our view, therefore, a state should act under the terms of article 4 only if
the dissemination of obnoxious ideas is accompanied by, or threatens imminently
to promote, the illegal act of racial discrimination. ...
• . . In accordance with the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association,
it is our view that organizations cannot be declared illegal if they merely attempt to
win acceptance of their beliefs by speech alone. However, if such organizations go
beyond advocacy of their views and engaged, or attempt to engage, in the illegal
act of racial discrimination itself, they come within the purview of the convention. 12
10. 9 U.N. G.A.O.R., Comm. to Define Agression, Supp. 11, at 9, U.N. Doc.
A/2638 (1954).
11. See International Control of Propaganda, 31 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 437-
635 (1966).
12. 55 DEPT. STATE BULL. 214 (1966). These views still prevail in American
constitutional law and have been applied to the arena of radio licensing. In Anti-
Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith v. F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169 (1968), the Federal
Communications Commission refused to censor a broadcaster accused of making
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It is fruitless to expect agreement on the content of human rights
to emerge solely through the repetition of practical proposals. De-
sirable as such efforts are, there is too much evidence of concrete
disagreement to justify optimism. Rather there is a need to stand
back, as it were, and reappraise ideological conflicts in the light of
the entire human rights program. Calm analysis should reveal that
each major ideology reflects important partial insights into the total
meaning of man in society, even though standing alone they fail as ef-
forts at comprehensive definition.
If we consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a
whole, we can view it as encompassing different aspects of a general
humanism. Beyond its introductory articles, the Declaration ad-
dresses itself (Articles 3-21) to the rights of the individual-his
personal freedoms as well as his civil and political rights. Another
important segment of the Declaration refers to the economic, social,
and cultural rights of man (Articles 22-27). Considering these sep-
arate sections as complementary parts of an overall commitment
to Human Rights, it is possible to trace a corresponding emphasis in
the major ideologies of democracy and socialism.
With respect to individual freedoms, a considerable part of the
values enumerated in the Declaration are substantially identical with
bigoted appeals to Anti-Semetic prejudice but required the licensee to afford free
time for response. In upholding the order, the then Circuit Judge Burger wrote:
"[Ideas concerning religious and racial matters] cannot be freely discussed if there
is to be an official ban on the utterance of 'falsehood' or an 'appeal to prejudice'
as officially defined. All that government can properly do, consistently with the
right of free speech, is to demand that the opportunity be kept open for the presen.
tation of all viewpoints." In Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
the Supreme Court upheld an F.C.C. regulation (the "fairness doctrine") requiring
the licensee to offer time for reply if an attack upon a personage occurs through
its facilities. For a critical analysis of the nature of free speech see the quotation
in infra note 25. This development suggests that there are some important areas
of comparative studies which should be examined to discover the diverse ways
that different ideologies realize values within their domestic legal orders. The
evolution of the "fairness doctrine" may demonstrate that the liberal tradition
has developed an effective means of meeting the dangers of free speech. Socialist
thinkers may also be interested in the way the collective bargaining process is
used to promote the freedom of workers and give them an effective role in the
management of enterprises. E.g., Local 189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Company, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (collective bargaining over marketing hours is
within national labor policy). Similarly, thinkers from capitalist countries could
profit from a study of the ways in which socialist countries balance creative prop-
erty with the needs of a national economy. See, e.g., Vida, The Law of Indus-
trial Property in the Peoples Democracies and the Soviet Union, 12 INT. & CoMP.
L.Q. 898 (1963).
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the theory of individual liberty which constitutes the distinctive
ethos of Western democracy. Freedom from arbitrary arrest, equal
protection under the law, rights of free expression and opinion-
these and related rights are bound up with the historical strug-
gles associated with the French and American Revolutions. Rights
of self-government acknowledged by the Declaration have their roots
in the constitutional democracy identified with Western, especially
Anglo-American humanism. Even the economic aspects of Western
ideology are reflected in the recognition of the right of each, singly
and in association, to own private property.
When considering the ideological basis for the economic, social
and cultural rights enumerated in the Declaration, one should
acknowledge that they have derived their major impetus from Marxist-
Leninist thought and the spirit of the October Revolution. This is
not to suggest that the protected values are exclusively dependent
upon such inspiration. Present protection of the rights of workers
are the result of universal efforts, but it is within socialist countries
that their advancement has been the dominant purpose of political
activity and governmental policy. 13 Within this ideology the dignity
13. 90 CONG. REC. 57 (1944) (remarks of President Roosevelt). "This Re-
public had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of
certain inalienable political rights-among them the right of free speech, free
press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
They were our rights to life and liberty. As our Nation has grown in size and
stature, however-as our industrial economy expanded-these political rights proved
inadequate to assure us equality in the pursuit of happiness. We have come to a
clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without
economic security and independence. 'Necessitous men are not freemen.' People
who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have
accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security
and prosperity can be established for all-regardless of station, race, or creed.
Among these are: The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries, or
shops or farms or mines of the Nation; the right to earn enough to provide ade-
quate food and clothing and recreation; the right of every farmer to raise and sell
his products at a return which will give him and his family a decent living; the
right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom
from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; the
right of every family to a decent home; the right to adequate medical care and
the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; the right to adequate protection
from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;
the right to a good education. All of these rights spell security. And after this
war is won, we must be prepared to move forward, in the implementation of these
rights, to new goals of human happiness and well-being." This address by Presi-
dent Roosevelt to the Congress of the United States and the failure of that body to
implement this "economic bill of rights" illustrates the fact that while there have
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of the working class, their emancipation from all forms of oppres-
sion, is of central significance. The same may be said, in general,
of the social and cultural rights of man which are consecrated by the
Declaration of Human Rights. Again, these values have been pro-
moted in all civilized societies, but it is the socialist countries which
have made their realization the overriding objective of government.
East Germany for example, relates its new constitution to the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural phases of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
A sense of relationship between separate ideological convictions
and total humanism proclaimed by the Universal Declaration can
reduce the antithesis which is presumed to exist between Western
democracy and Marxist socialism and which has impeded the de-
velopment of a consensus on the content of human rights. Hostility
is moderated if we consider each philosophic view as a part of whole
humanism rather than as a self-sufficient, complete explanation of
man in society. But we can go further. The authentic agreement
on supreme common values which is the essential precondition of a
universal criminal code can be approximated if ideological ad-
vocates understand that the human values associated with their particu-
lar philosophy and tradition are becoming part of their adversaries'
political life.
"[I]ntellectual freedom is essential to human society-freedom to
obtain and distribute information, freedom for open-minded and un-
fearing debate .. ."' One would assume that these lines were
written by a person nurtured in the libertarian tradition of Western
democracy. Yet they are the impassioned voice of Andrei Sakharov,
the Soviet scientist who made important contributions to the develop-
ment of the hydrogen bomb. The same writer not only champions
intellectual freedom but also vigorously denounces the inhuman
treatment of political prisoners during the Stalinist era.
In the West, there is an increasing awareness of inequities the
perception of which has been traditionally considered a Marxist pre-
been particular creative efforts, and some notable accomplishments in the field of
labor, the welfare of workers has never been the overriding policy of Western
capitalism. The observations about America are also true of Great Britain even
though socialist policies are an integral part of its national life.
14. SAKHAROV, PROGRESS, Co-ExISTENCE, AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 29
(1966).
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rogative. Outrage at economic exploitation, a sense of injustice
aroused by evidence of economic hegemony, can no longer be con-
sidered a socialist copyright. Within the United States, there is a
widespread reaction against the consequences of unequal bargain-
ing power. And the dissent is too broadly based to permit its re-
duction to categories of class struggle. Provisions against the enforce-
ment of "unconscionable" agreements in the Uniform Commercial
Code, for example, 15 refute any assumptions that the American ethic
can be understood solely as a "capitalistic" thesis. A growing con-
cern for the economic rights of man is becoming an integral part of
Western life. President Roosevelt's call for an economic bill of
rights at the close of World War II,10 and the expansion of the right of
property to encompass fundamental needs17 are evidence of this
trend.
These emerging patterns of conduct suggest that values once
thought of as part of exclusive ideologies have in fact a general hu-
man quality. But the transideological nature of contemporary life
is perhaps best revealed in the emerging critiques of technology. It
is becoming increasingly clear that all advanced industrial societies,
whether they arise in the West or under socialist inspiration, carry in
their train common dangers to human life. Problems such as pol-
lution, environmental control, transportation, and the dehumanizing
effects of mass culture are indifferent to ideology. And, as they have
global consequences, they expose the common plight of man. In-
deed, it is probable that technology rather than capitalism is the
major cause of modern man's alienation. The concept of aliena-
tion has a general significance in Marxist thought, and is capable of
application to any situation in which man is separated from his
true essence. Yet socialist as well as capitalist countries are finding
that contradictions betwen economic growth and human happiness
are a part of any industrial milieu of abundant productivity and
efficiency. All developed societies suffer that affluent alienation
equally unknown to Marx or Adam Smith.' 8
15. U.C.C. 2-302. There is extensive commentary on the new code, e.g., Ell-
inghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969).
16. See text, supra note 13.
17. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
18. The best general critique is MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964),
Although he has socialist sympathies, Marcuse applies his insights to all advanced
296 [Vol. =X: 28 6
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PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES
The definition and protection of human rights have become the
major purpose of an international criminal code. But such an
achievement has not been forthcoming. The practical failure to ob-
tain such a consensus is the result of many geo-political causes of
which ideological division is an important factor. Some of this
division can be reduced if values considered to be the prerogatives
of particular ideologies are seen as emerging within the social fabric
of the presumably alien system. We move closer to a sense of
community when we see that the problems of modem society tran-
scend ideologies. But we must probe further. Beyond a phenom-
enological awareness of common humanity we must examine the
philosophic premises of the ideologies in question. What concep-
tions of human nature, what views of man in society lie behind
Western democracy and socialist humanism?
Western theories of man are radically individualistic. Abstract
rights proclaimed by the French and American Revolutions gained
concrete expression in the individualism and self-sufficient ethic
which has characterized Western experience. Particularly man has
been placed at the center of political and social existence. The
evolution of constitutional liberties, the advent of the industrial
revolution, and an introspective tradition of philosophy and psy-
chology contributed to this growth.'" From it there emerged three
paramount conceptions of man in society which are important to
the present study, all of which involve the relationship between the
individual and the state. The first concerns the basis of social or-
ganization. In the view of Western democracy, government de-
pends upon the consent of the governed. This idea has its roots in
British constitutionalism and gained particular force in the creation
of the Constitution of the United States which, as historians have
noted, was the first concrete expression of the autonomy of the peo-
industrial societies and is conscious of the limits of orthodox Marxism in the
present epoch. See, e.g., Marcuse, Socialist Humanism in SOCIALIST HUMANISM 107
(Fromm ed. 1966). The phrase affluent alienation is taken from the introduction
to that volume. Cf. Stanmeyer, The Jurisprudence of Radical Change: Herbert
Marcuse's "Great Refusal" v. Political Due Process, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1970).
19. There is a good overview of this culture in NORTHRUP, THE MEETING OF
EAST AND WEST, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING (1950).
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pie as a constitutive power. 20  Upon these premises the govern-
ment has been conceived as an agent of the public. Yet de-
mocracy has generally maintained a negative view of the state. The
sense of individual freedom expressed in a Bill of Rights which the
individual could plead against the state was the strongest expres-
sion of this hostility. In the economic sphere the purpose of gov-
ernment is to facilitate the pursuit and protection of wealth.
These conceptions of man and government make up the core of
Western democratic ideology. Expressed as an ideology, they offer
in the mind of their advocates a comprehensive moral view of the
human condition. In some form, they reflect the minimal order of
human values which must be part of a common international value
system.
We have already observed how some of these values of this
ideology, such as intellectual freedom and the concept of due process,
are viewed by prominent individuals in socialist countries as indis-
pensable to civilized existence. But the individual liberty expressed
in rights of private property is more difficult for persons outside
the Western orbit to accept. Marxism, particularly, has uncovered
the connection between capitalism and human alienation; socialism
is determined to remove harmful capitalist influence from the new
human community. Western leaders are equally adamant in insisting
upon jural protection of private acquisitions. The general develop-
ment of a human rights program is obstructed by this issue and some
adjustment of these differences is essential to the establishment of an
international criminal law. The concept of "economic aggression"
is still an important part of the thinking of developing countries with
respect to universal crimes.
Marxist thought has mercilessly exposed the inhuman conse-
quences of private property: its immense potentialities for exploita-
tion as well as its radical tendency towards an anti-social selfish-
ness. But it would be erroneous to conclude that the institution of
private property is devoid of human sigrficance. The tenacity
with which Western thought (particularly in the United States) clings
to private modes of economic activity cannot be explained purely in
20. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION; E. MORGAN, THE
BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC (1956).
298 [Vol. XXI:286
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dialectic terms. Beneath the ideological rhetoric lie convictions of
human value which deserve closer examination than they have pre-
viously received.
From a socialist perspective, private property is a negative force
in the economy. It deprives others of what rightfully belongs to
them and directly contributes to social disorder. This viewpoint re-
flects insights of great value, but is incomplete. There is another
aspect to "private enterprise" which deserves to be considered: the
significance attached to the term in the evolution of Western thought.
In Anglo-American experience, property was conceived in more
positive terms. Particularly in America, where the development of
a vast continent called for enormous expenditures of capital and
human effort, the economic activity of free men was of special im-
portance. Private property was honored for the public good which
resulted from its use.2' More deeply, philosophic convictions about
the quality of individual life placed the institution of property upon a
firm foundation. The external role of property grew, in part, from
internal qualities of personal dignity. The legal historian Willard
Hurst summed up this attitude in the opening chapter of his study
of Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century
United States:
The base lines of . . . public policy . . . are three: (I) Human nature is creative,
and its meaning lies largely in the expression of its creative capacity; hence it is so-
cially desirable that there be broad opportunity for the release of creative human
energy. (II) Corollary to the creative competence which characterizes human na-
ture, the meaning of life for men rests also in their possessing liberty, which
means basically possessing a wide practical range of options as to what they do and
how they are affected by circumstances. (Ill) These propositions have special sig-
nificance for the future of mankind as they apply in the place and time of the adven-
ture of the United States; here unclaimed natural abundance together with the promise
of new technical command of nature dictates that men should realize their creative
energy and exercise their liberty peculiarly in the realm of the economy to the en-
hancement of other human values.22
There have been important modifications in this conception of
nature as the American and international economies have passed far
into the twentieth century. Domestically, the optimism which under-
lies the quotation had, by 1900, been cooled by revelations of capi-
21. See the comparative observations of BROGAN, AMERICA IN THE MODERN
WORLD ch. 3 (1960).
22. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 5 (1956).
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talist rapacity. The human conscience is now aware of the public
character of the natural resources which an earlier age was willing to
commit to the private domain.28 Yet there remains a positive ele-
ment of truth in the Western view of enterprise. The "right" of
private property surely does not encompass unjust enrichment or
profiteering, nor is the right proposed as an alternative to communal
control of economic development. But, in proper proportions, the
recognition of private property finds its justification in that human
dignity which a world order should promote. Material prosperity is
an integral part of modern life; economic goods and the intangible
values they generate reflect, in large measure, forms of individ-
ual creativity which are not reducible to Marxist-Leninist categories
of labor. Not only do they evidence a wide range of sophistica-
tion, but many of the financial, industrial, and technological improve-
ments needed in modern life can arise only in an atmosphere of eco-
nomic liberty. The necessary community of values can only
arise in international society when the creative dimension of private
ownership is acknowledged and where protection against its arbi-
trary deprivation is assured.2 4
Within the tradition of Western democracy there is a strong sense
of personal dignity. In the realm of socio-political life, as well as in
the field of economic activity, a conviction that each person has
inherent values which are beyond the power of the state is an es-
sential part of this ideology. This experience has given great im-
petus to the rise of human rights in universal moral experience,
but the development has not been perfect. We have acknowledged
the limits within which creative economic freedom can be consid-
ered as a positive human value; qualifications also surround the per-
sonal civic and political liberties which are cherished by the West.
Freedom of expression, for example, which is projected by the ide-
ology as an absolute value, has limits which are being acknowledged
within democratic countries. 25  The same may be said of some of
23. E.g., Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources G.A.
Res. 1803, 17 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). The text is
published in 57 AM. J. INT'L 710 (1963).
24. For an analysis of the standard of arbitrariness see, Murphy, State Re-
sponsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1966).
25. Compare the thoughts of a Bar Association President on the limits of free
speech with the libertarian expression of Ambassador Goldberg, quoted supra
note 12. "It is, I suppose, still good Constitutional doctrine that it is time for
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the nuances of due process, especially as they apply in the field of
criminal procedure.2 6  The continued vitality of these values is
not being denied but their absolute characterization is being ques-
tioned.
The tendency to place unlimited or excessive interpretations
upon human rights is an inevitable danger whenever the individual
is placed at the center of jurisprudential interest. There is an in-
clination to treat the particular man in isolation from the society
in which he is a part. This tendency stands in sharp contrast to
Marxist humanism. For the Marxist knows only social man; the ideo-
logy has no integral conception of the singular person.27 With Marxist
Government to step in to regulate people when they do something, not when they
say something. . . . The undeniable fact, of course, is that one may be as effec-
tively assaulted and battered by words as by physical contact and that words and
deeds are increasingly indistinguishable parts of the same continuum of be-
havior. It is part of the genius of our judicial system that we do reinterpret con-
stitutional mandates in the light of tremendous technological change and new social
conditions. Is it time to ask ourselves whether the classic dichotomy between
words and acts has meaning in the context of our present society? Ought we take
cognizance of a revolution in communications that has given us an infinite capacity
for transforming, by a kind of geometric progression of repetition, inflammatory
words into action and counteraction? We live in a time when dissent is no longer
expressed in pamphleteering. The preferred method of communication is by dem-
onstrations, mass picketing, physical confrontations. We have seen, by some
strange semantic alchemy, the right of peaceable assembly turned into the 'right'
to mass in the streets, to disrupt traffic, to keep other citizens from going about
their lawful occasions, to kidnap the facilities of our cities, to seize the buildings
of colleges and universities, to occupy the halls of government, and to wreak physi-
cal harm upon those who do not agree with us. I find it difficult to accept ex-
tortion and blackmail as methods of peaceful persuasion or a brick through a
window as a constitutionally protected petition." 51 CHICAGO B.R. 262, 263-64
(1970).
26. See the report on criminal justice in Vol. I No. 7 THE CENTER MAGAZINE
69 (Fund for the Republic 1968).
27. See the analysis in MARITAIN, MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1964).' The different
emphasis: individualism and social solidarity is also reflected in the diverse ap-
proaches towards political involvement. Socialist countries stress participation in
political affairs as the ideal mode of temporal existence; in the West, political ac-
tivity tends to be looked upon as a provisional necessity, engaged in as a means of
preserving singular life. A study of Jeffersonian attitudes is enlightening: "The
pursuit of happiness had to be postponed until the political world was set aright.
Jefferson nowhere indicates that happiness is to be sought or found in political ac-
tion. The whole thrust of his thought leads, not to the conclusion that men pursue
happiness in the political realm, but that political action is unfortunately necessary
from time to time in order to arrange the public affairs so that it will be possible
for individuals to pursue happiness in the private realm. It is possible to justify
political involvement in Epicurean terms, as Jefferson did, but only at the expense
of making public life entirely secondary and instrumental of private life." Schaar,
And the Pursuit of Happiness, 46 VIRG. QUART. REV. 1 (1970).
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notions of human freedom, man is liberated and finds his true destiny
by absorbing himself in the needs of the community.
This emphasis upon community and social solidarity explains the
fervor with which the bloc nations support the economic, social,
and cultural phases of the human rights programs as well as their
special advocacy of anti-colonial movements. In themselves, these
are important values, especially in the manner that they accentuate
the dignity of labor and the priority of national community in mat-
ters of economic development. Of particular importance to the pres-
ent study is the role which is accorded the state in the implemen-
tation of these values.
To guarantee the realization of economic, social, and cultural
rights, socialist theory assigns an important role to the active inter-
vention of government. As its conception of man is social, it con-
siders "rights" as emanating from the state which represents the
whole. To the degree that the theory emphasizes positive govern-
ment it has much to commend it. The negative view of the
state which has prevailed in Western democracies has been over-
stated; the reassertion of the state as a creative force is in some meas-
ure desirable. The stress upon the social character of existence is
also worthwhile, especially since it highlights the importance of the
public domain, a dimension which is all too frequently ignored in
Western countries. Furthermore, the importance which socialist
countries place upon culture as a fund of historic goods which all
are entitled to share is a perspective which deserves widespread con-
sideration.
But the ideology has some questionable assumptions, particularly
in the manner in which it conceives the individual's position vis a vis
the State. One major drawback is the Hegelian mode in which the
state is conceptualized. The state in socialist thought is the person-
ification of an abstract humanisn which absorbs into its generality
the particular persons which make up the body politic. This ap-
proach to, or rather solution of, the problem of the individual was
clearly expressed by the Soviet delegate during the debates over the
proposed Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Replying to sug-
gestions that the Soviet state did not give proper respect to the individ-
ual, the Russian representative replied by reducing the problem of
individualism to the Marxist dialectic. Contradictions between the
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individual and the state existed when society was divided into rival
classes with capitalist exploiters as the dominant class. In the
new communist state the problem was solved because
the government was in fact the collective individual. That contradiction was elim-
inated when a society reached a stage when it was no longer divided into classes
conflicting with each other, the class of the exploiter and the class of the exploited. 2s
Such a synthesis misses the essential meaning of Western individ-
ualism, which, in spite of its faults, brings to the problem a much
deeper understanding of human personality.
The approach of democracy to the question of the individual
and the state possesses, in a sense, a degree of illogic. Its insight
is such that it postulates individual rights in a way which appear to
contradict democratic theory. The idea that the individual has
rights which he can plead against the state is sustained by a con-
viction that the single person is of such intrinsic worth that he de-
serves to be protected from the harmful consequences of a majority
or abstract will. 29  Such an approach may have dangers of excessive
isolation of the individual from the social whole, but it nevertheless
expresses a fundamental truth about human dignity.
The importance of this Western ideal can be best illustrated in an
area which is of particular concern to socialist theory: the field of
economic rights. To assure that everyone has the necessary essentials
of life the state must play an active role. All forms of unemploy-
ment compensation, welfare, old age assistance, etc. depend upon
the operations of many government agencies. From a Marxist per-
spective, it could be argued that this modern phenomenon proves
the ideological thesis that all fights flow from the state, that the
state has "become" the individual. But what if a state agency denies
assistance to a person in need? The realization of individual ec-
onomic rights can be fully guaranteed only if the individual is ac-
corded rights which he can exercise over against state power. ° Some
28. 3 U.N. G.A.O.R. 333 (1948).
29. For the application of the idea to the institution of judicial review, see
BLACK, OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE 17 (1963).
30. See the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) in which it was held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a public assistance recipient
must be given an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of benefits.
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sense of a separate relationship between the individual and govern-
ment by which the state can be called to account seems indispen-
sible to humanistic progress.
The scope of international crimes includes considerations of polit-
ical authority. The problem of civil war and intervention raises
issues of aggression whose resolutions are conditioned by concepts of
legitimate rule. If internal strife is seen as a phase of the struggle
between the exploiters and the exploited, such an interpretation
colors one's judgment as to the propriety of a foreign power's inter-
est. It becomes important therefore to understand what is meant by
the ideologies of socialism and Western democracy when they invoke
the human right of self-government.
In Marxist-Leninist ideology, a regime of the rule of workers is
projected as a political ideal. It is as the representative of the work-
ing class (industrial and/or rural) that the ruling elites in socialist
countries justify their political power. It is demonstrable that such
a hypothesis can be a facade for tyranny,"' but, in philosophic terms,
the weakness of the theory runs deeper.
The flaw lies in the assumption that political authority is vested in
one part of the body politic. It is probably true that some of the
major transformations of social existence will, in the foreseeable fu-
ture, result from the political action of alienated groups.3 2  But it
is important to distinguish between a political movement and politi-
cal authority. The energies of a limited number may provide the
impetus for change, but their leadership does not divest others of their
right to participate in political processes and to demand an account-
ability from whomever may govern.
It is in this respect that the concept of "the people" has a deeper
significance in Western democratic theory. Anglo-American politi-
cal experience reveals a continuing effort to make the franchise re-
sponsive to an ideal of the whole populace as the source of sover-
eign authority. The removal of property qualifications, woman's
suffrage, realization of voting power for racial minorities, the
reapportionment phenomenon, and related historical events suggest
31. E.g., DJILAS, THE NEW CLASS; CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN (1962).
32. See, the work of Michael Harrington, a member of the American Socialist
Party, TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC LEFT (1969).
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an orientation pointed towards the full realization of self-govern-
ment. a1
The Western experience is filled with imperfections, and in prac-
tice the socialist countries have, in some respects, surpassed the
West. The level of actual participation in the affairs of government
is probably higher in those countries where Marxist ideology prevails.
But there is, in the Western view, an essential point about the nature
of political authority which is of fundamental importance to the pro-
tection of human rights.
The importance of this question can be better understood where
its implications are drawn to mind. The possession of political au-
thority by all the people includes the corollary that all have a right to
call government to account. Accountability is assured not only
through periodic elections, but also by the voice of criticism. Liberty
of expression is essential to a free people, especially as it may be
directed towards those in power. Criticism, as well as sovereignty,
belongs to all; human rights cannot flourish unless everyone, and not
just members of a particular class, have a right to speak on public is-
sues.
CONCLUSION
A criminal law will be created by the people of the world when
they co-exist in a universe of shared values. At the present stage of
33. Consider the remarks of George F. Kennen, former ambassador to the
U.S.S.R., made at the Pacem In Terris Conference in reply to a call for peaceful
coexistence by Dr. Adam Schaff, a member of the Central Committee of the
United Workers Party of Poland: ". . . You, Dr. Schaff, talk about coexistence as
something that stops at the point of ideology, and about a policy, really, of a non-
coexistence in the ideological field. The ideological contest, as you Communists see
it, is not only an intellectual competition but a political competition. It is a politi-
cal competition that involves not only the minds of men, as you say, but also, I am
sorry to say, their fears-a competition that does not entirely respect what is in
men's minds because it does not fully recognize the organized expression of the
popular will. There would be no one quicker than I to admit that all parliamentary
systems, all systems of elections, are imperfect. There are many abuses. What
comes out of them is a very rough justice and a very rough expression of the popular
will, often much rougher than I would like to see in our own country. But it is this
which lies at the heart of our disagreement with you. We feel that until there exists
on the Communist side a disposition to accept expressions of the popular will, how-
ever imperfect, as the ultimate basis of political action and of the determination of
political authority, there will remain a contradiction between the concept of ideologi-
cal competition that you have put forward here and the concept of coexistence
about which we are speaking." ON COEXISTENCE 26 (Occasional Paper, Center
For the Study of Democratic Institutions 1965).
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history the development of man is retarded by conflicting ideologies.
But we stand on the threshold of a humanistic age. International
rules to protect human dignity will come to be when nations realize
that their idea of man is part of a larger vision of human rights.
To realize the rule of law we must renounce our obsession with
practical proposals and reflectively examine the reasons for ideo-
logical conflict and the potentials of reconciliation. A certain hu-
mility is required, because progress depends upon the general ack-
nowledgment that no particular ideology constitutes a monopoly
of truth. But the loss of pride is of little consequence; as our vis-
tas enlarge, we shall gain that community of shared values which
is the sine qua non of effective law.
